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Recidivism is a technical term which is defined as a "falling
back or relapse into prior criminal habits, especially after punishment." Legal control over it is 'generally considered an impractical
and unattainable goal. Attention was directed toward it many years
ago when it was said, "we punish an offender not because he has
offended but that he may not offend again." Society has never
ceased to hope however, that ultimately it would be able to rely upon
the courts to handle criminal offenders in such a way that the commission of future crime would be definitely retarded. No matter
how impossible it may seem that we will ever be able to predict with
certainty what any individual may do in the future; and no matter
how improbable it may seem that society can exercise any control
over uncommitted acts, we must nevertheless, always keep our eyes
fixed upon this objective. If we are willing to be satisfied with less
we merely admit that the imposition of a criminal sentence is the
sole objective of court procedure. It is apparent, however, that inflicting punishment for past offenses has not been uniformly successful in protecting society from crime. Obviously as long as we retain
control over the person of an offender we can prevent him from
committing further crime. If, however, we ever expect to release
him his recidivistic tendencies are of vital social importance. A legal
control over recidivism is therefore a legal objective toward which
we must constantly strive if we expect a constructive social benefit
to grow out of court action.
Those who are concerned with the administration of that part of
our government which is devoted to dealing with crime have always
contended that control over recidivism was not primarily a legal
problem. They allege that there are certain legal barriers which
make it impossible for the courts to exercise a uniform control over
what a released offender may do in the future. It seems apparent
that the courts are justified in refusing to accept responsibility for the
acts of those whose legal punishment has failed to prevent their
1Attorney-at-Law, 802 Engineers Building, Cleveland, Ohio.
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return to crime. Irrespective of where responsibility properly rests
society has the right to demand the best possible protection from
crime and we must bend every effort toward producing this benefit.
If a modern age has made possible the attainment of more comprehensive objectives we must not hesitate to adapt our legal system to
the performance of new duties. Even the iron hand of precedent
must not be permitted to bar the way. It is interesting to observe
that if we contemplate an adjustment of criminal procedure in line
with recidivistic control that we will strike deep at the heart of
established legal theory.
If we were to select one outstanding concept of the law which
has never been the target of general adverse criticism it would probably be our theory of legal jurisdiction. We have always strived to
keep intact the idea that no criminal court can ever exercise its delegated power to assess a fine or take away any personal rights unless
it was first shown that there was a justifiable legal 'basis for such
action. We have always taken it for granted that the proper basis
was a committed criminal act upon which we predicate our legal
right to sentence an offender. It is therefore apparent that all court
action must follow upon the heels of a past offence. As soon as we
attempt to use this theory to prevent uncommitted acts the impossibility of direct legal action is at once apparent and we realize that all
hope of recidivistic control depends upon an indirect effect.
We also find that the law is now functioning under the theory
that whatever punishment is imposed by statute for the commission
of a criminal act must be determined -by the act. Crime is nothing
more than a statutory list of anti-social acts which are so detrimental
to society that they cannot be tolerated by any well organized social
structure. When society first considered what punishment should
follow conviction for each act it was at once apparent that there was
a great deal of difference between the different offenses in so far as
the seriousness of their effect upon society was concerned. Surely
the effect of the act of pocket picking was far less serious than the
effect of the act of premeditated murder. To meet this situation fairly
a penalty was devised which would arbitrarily reflect as nearly as
possible a general conception of the seriousness of the offence. The
possible punishments were death, life imprisonment and imprisonment
for any length of time less than life. The first adaptation of these
possible penalties to the various criminal offences has not been
rigidly adhered to. As generation after generation considered this
problem various alterations have evolved. While the punishments
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of death and life imprisonment cannot be altered, there has been a
gradual tendency to decrease the number of crimes to which they
apply. Incarceration for a term less than life does however, present
unlimited possibilities for variation. As a matter of fact this type of
punishment covers by far the largest proportion of the acts listed by
statute as crimes. Now the law has always assumed that for any
term ;of imprisonment less than life the maximum length of time
must be definitely fixed by law and as such constitute a legal mandate
prescribing the extreme limit of court authority. Under our present
system this maximum term is determined solely by an arbitrary legislative enactment which considers only the seriousness of the offence.
For example in Ohio grand larceny calls for a penalty of imprisonment of "not less than one year or more than seven years." Burning
property with intent to defraud demands a sentence of not less than one
year or more than ten years." Burglary of an uninhabited dwelling
rates a sentence of "not less than one or more than fifteen years" while
if the dwelling is inhabited a sentence of "not more than thirty years
or less than five years" is prescribed. While it may appear logical
to impose penalties which reflect the difference in the degree of seriousness of the different offences it becomes obviously illogical when
we observe that by so doing we automatically classify allcriminals not
as to the degree of protection which society should have from them
but solely upon the basis of a particular offence which they have
already committed. The latter classification is inherently unsound
since it implies that the commission of the same act by different
individuals indicates a similarity between them. It is apparent today
that any such attempt to generalize is obviously erroneous. We are
aware today that the same act may be committed by individuals
whose behavior reactions emanate from radically different sources.
With this in mind we can never expect a statute to intelligently predict in advance the maximum term when an offender should be legally
entitled to release.
By predetermining a definite maximum date
when release must be allowed and predicating this date solely upon
the offence, we disregard the known element of individual difference
which is inherent in every criminal act.
Now when we consider the objective of controlling recidivism
under these legal handicaps it becomes apparent that without alteration
they present unsurmountable barriers. Before we can ever expect to
accomplish our purpose the theory of jurisdiction must be expanded
so that it will include a legal right of control over every criminal
offender who is potentially dangerous, such control to be legally justi-
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fled for as long a time as potential danger continues to exist. Society
is much more concerned with what an offender may do in the future
than with what he has done in the past. If we do this we will require
a legalized court jurisdiction which is predicated solely upon a capacity
to predict. It extends the limit of court control for as long a time
as the offender remains likely to- offend again. It involves divorcing
the criminal act from the sentence and basing it upon the particularindividual who is to serve it.
While this may appear theoretically sound it is nevertheless open
to the charge of impracticability. The number of convicted offenders
is so great that it seems impractical to try and individualize the
process. We must recognize, however, that our present capacity to
predict is limited and that it applies only to one of two definite and
determinable classes of offenders. One class consists of those who,
as far as we can now determine, are physically and mentally, normal
and who have had at all times complete control over their own behavior reactions. The other group falls definitely under the abnormal
and subnormal classification. As to the first class, punishment is
probably the safest weapon of social defence and we can rely upon it
as creating a fairly uniform deterrent effect. As to the latter group
punishment is completely impotent since we can never expect that
those who compose it will react uniformly to the same treatment.
As to each one we must know what their abnormalities or subnormalities are, and with this data as a determining factor, society must
proceed intelligently to protect itself from them.
If we contemplate any theory of criminal jurisdiction which will
legalize a right to impose a sentence predicated upon a capacity to
predict what it seems will happen in the future, we must never expect
to apply it to the so-called normal individual. Where no mental or
physical abnormality or subnormality can be found, there is no ground
upon which we can base a prediction with reference to Riture behavior reactions. In sentencing normal individuals we must rely upon
the direct deterrent effect of a prescribed predetermined punishment
to curb whatever recidivistic tendencies may exist and hope that some
indirect beneficial result will also be accomplished.
If we eliminate all those who are normal we open the door to
recidivistic control, only over those who come under the abnormal or
sub-normal classification. As to this group we can no longer safely
disregard the fact that science can find out things about them which
bear directly upon the problem of crime control. With this in mind
we find ourselves confronted with a problem which requires an en-
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tirely different method of attack. Here possibilities are presented
for establishing a direct control over recidivism. It is not based
solely upon a desire to determine the exact degree of responsibility
with which it is fair to charge an offender but adopts the point
of view of diagnosing recidivistic tendencies and establishing the
necessary social protection from them. Scientific knowledge of individuals gives us information about them which can be used as a
warning indicating what we must be on our guard against in the
future. In many instances, it is data upon which we can fairly base
a prediction as to what a certain individual's reactions will be in the
future. When this is possible we are able to determine with a high
degree of accuracy the potential danger of an individual which at
once establishes the type of treatment and degree of protection which
society must have from him.
Take for example a scientific diagnosis of a chronic alcoholic
condition. Thirty days in the workhouse cannot possibly deter a
return to the offender's previous condition simply by reason of the
fact that his condition remains unaltered. Unless the sentence prescribed tends to bring this condition under control the entire treatment is an economic waste. No social benefit can result and the
individual is exactly the same after sentence as before.- What must
be done with him to protect society from him has no relation whatsoever to any particular spree. Drug addiction, venereal disease and
a host of other definitely determinable physical conditions may be
diagnosed beyond question of a doubt. There are many instances
in which cures may be effected and others for which no cure is now
known to exist. Without relying upon speculation it would be safe
to predict that a confirmed drug addict will commit whatever criminal offense may be necessary to satisfy his craving. That venereal
disease will spread infection is not a guess but predictable fact. Any
one of these predictions may be safely made without working any injustice upon the individual. A host of sex abnormalities can be accurately diagnosed and the prediction made that serious criminal
offenses will normally result from them. It is not a mere guess
when we say that surely sometime in the indefinite future, when conditions favor their expression, that society will have to suffer the
effects of vicious crime. Progress in the field of mental diagnosis
has attained an amazing degree of accuracy in classifying those who
are in a greater or lesser degree abnormal or subnormal. Science
can compare observable individual conditions with previously established standards of normality. We can recognize today intermittent

HAROLD M. METCALF

states of emotional instability which fall short of complete mental
irresponsibility but which nevertheless are discernible potential danger.
We find examples of slight feeblemindedness and those who are definitely feebleminded. We find the moron, the psychopathic personality along with the complete irresponsibility of dementia praecox.
The extent of this field is indicated by recent statistics showing that
approximately eighty per cent of the inmates of one Ohio penal institution were mentally defective. Irrespective of the degree of control which the various defectives can exercise over their own behavior the existence of these conditions are today determinable
scientific facts. Each type of mental weakness carries with it a danger
signal which is expressed in no uncertain terms. While the precise
act which may be committed cannot be known in advance any more
than the name of the innocent person who will suffer from it, the
potential possibilities are an apparent fact. We can even go further
and point out the type of social environment which is favorable to
the growth of crime. The crime spots in any large urban center stand
out with unquestioned clarity. It is no idle boast to say that those
who are informed can predict. the percent of crime which will come
out of the population of any given district.
All of this leads us to the fair conclusion that we have today a
limited capacity to predict which did not exist at the time our criminal procedure system crystallized into its present form. The acquisition of this power has created a distinct advance in our capacity to
protect society by bringing within the realm of possibility a limited
legal control over recidivism. If the law refuses to 'recognize this
newly acquired means of defense and continues to cling to its perogative of dealing exclusively with crime, we will continue to turn out of
our criminal control system a continuous stream of individuals whose
recidivistic tendencies can be accurately predicted but over whom we
have voluntarily released control.
If we ever intend to benefit practically by these scientific advances the law must open its own door to permit their application. It
is a restricted field however, in which the law is not supreme and its
successful use depends upon the application of an entirely different
kind of knowledge and procedure. The law as a specialized science
is designed to determine fairly and justly whether or not a certain
act comes under the statute and if it does whether or not the one who
is accused of committing it is actually guilty as charged. The process
safeguards the accused against the possible error of being found guilty
of doing something which he did not do. If he is found guilty after
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this procedure he cannot charge unfairness if his ultimate disposition
is determined by an ex parte proceeding. To delegate this problem
largely to science is not only doing justice to society but to the individual as well. An enhancement of the scope of legal jurisdiction
over the person, predicated upon scientific determinations and conclusions is not an elimination of the right to "due process of law."
If abnormal and subnormal individuals are today a scientific reality
then there should be a social right to differentiate them from those
in whom no abnormality is found to exist. Modem society has the
right to demand protection from potential danger in so far as it is
possible to furnish it. Insanity must not be the only pathological
condition recognized by the law since the recognition of lesser conditions is equally important. We must exercise our capacity to sentence
abnormal and subnormal offenders in such a way as to guard against
predictable recidivism. In no other way can the courts avoid the
absurdity of using their powers solely for the purpose of imposing
ineffectual punishment which. must fail to accomplish the ultimate
protection of society.
No discussion of these questions can disregard the fact that our
present system is now functioning along with parole boards, probation departments and that the indeterminate sentence is now in force
in Ohio. While these relatively recent developments are without
doubt distinct advances in our theory of penology their only practical
effect is to permit the mitigation of the prescribed maximum statutory
term. The right and power of the legislature to fix and predetermine
this maximum term has never been delegated. Without denying that
these humanitarian developments are necessary and justifiable we
must not forget that the maximum protection of society demands that
the criminal sentence result in a decrease in the commission of future
crime. A desire to promote the welfare of the offender by providing the legal machinery by which a prescribed statutory term may be
decreased does not alter the fact that our present maximum criminal
sentences are grossly inadequate to control the recidivism of those
who are not permitted to take advantage of mitigation procedure but
who earn their release by serving their sentence in full.
It is not difficult to find ample legal provision for mitigating the
strict letter of the law. Parole boards may release an offender prior
to the expiration date of his full term of sentence. This right is
exercised by them only after acquiring complete data upon every
individual. Probation applies to a group of carefully selected convicted offenders who appear deserving of aid in accomplishing their
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own rehabilitation. In certain cases the judge may permit supervision outside of prison to take the place of incarceration. The indeterminate sentence is designed to allow the release of an offender
at such time as he appears qualified to receive it but the maximum
term is still operative as the extreme limit of court authority. Even
under the indeterminate sentence the offender must be released when
he has served the extreme statutory term prescribed for his act.
While these are obvious advances over the old system they do not
cover the necessity of retaining jurisdiction over an offender for as
long a time as he is known to be potentially dangerous.
To point out that a need exists without suggesting any constructive method of meeting it is merely destructive criticism. New benefits must be obtained by expanding our theories as to our right to impose sentence. The first step is to provide for the classification of
every, criminal offender. It could be initiated in our felony courts.
This procedure must permit a pause between conviction and sentence.
During this pause every convicted offender must be examined, diagnosed and classified. The first objective would be to separate the
normal and subnormal. This must follow conviction and precede
sentence. All normal offenders should then be sentenced as provided by law today. There would be available to them all, of the
present legal machinery which permits mitigation and-for the same
reasons. Those who are found to be in any degree abnormal or subnormal must come under the scope of a new theory of sentence.
Those whose defects can be cured and those whose condition holds
out some hope of reacting favorable to intelligently prescribed treatment would be required to undergo whatever regime presents the
most hope of remedying their condition. As to them, their release
would be permitted by the court only as such time as the examining
board were willing to assume the responsibility of recommending it.
Others whose abnormalities were such that no method of treatment
could be prescribed would remain in custody for as long a time as
their condition indicated the existence of potential danger.
This
could mean that a relatively minor offense might direct the attention
of the agencies of law enforcement to incurable defects which would
require permanent supervision by the state as the price of adequate
social protection.
To obtain adequate data and to make the necessary diagnosis
requires time and the training and skill of those who are scientifically
trained. No intelligent sentence can be imposed immediately after
conviction since the controlling facts must be acquired. The classifica-
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tion of individuals depends upon the compilation of scientific data
and its use by adequately trained and qualified specialists. While we
may feel that the world is overemphasizing specialization we must
admit that a trained observer is better able to formulate an intelligent
scientific conclusion than a legislature which makes an arbitrary generalization. The effectiveness of the courts depends upon their capacity to accomplish a series of effective individual results and we can
never expect uniform results as the product of a generalized criminal
law. To relate a criminal sentence intelligently to an individual
offender requires that the time, the place and the facilities be provided where this type of work can be done. Each offender immediately after his conviction should be sent to an institution which might
be designated a House of Criminal Classification. The prime objective would be to determine how much protection society should
have from each offender and how this could best be provided. Such
an institution organized, staffed and equipped to classify all types of
persons the normal and the 'curable and incurable defective would
at once become a recognized part of the strong arm of the law. After
compiling the necessary data and making the necessary diagnosis
from it the examining board could submit a report to the trial judge
which would contain their recommendations as to the most effective
type of sentence. The trial judge would then impose sentence in each
case with this information before him. As to all abnormal cases
however, there must be no legislative limitation upon the court authority to retain jurisdiction over the person of the offender. The
date of sentence termination cannot be prescribed at the time sentence
is imposed. It must be within the power of the examining board
to make recommendations as to release at such time as the individual's
observed condition indicates that it is safe to do so. This right must
not be denied upon the basis that it is in conflict with established
jurisdictional rights. Under such a system the determination as to
when release should be permitted becomes a part of the procedure
but may be acted upon at any time. When sentence is imposed
under such an arrangement neither the offender, the court or society
could have any idea as to the date when society would voluntarily
relinquish its control over an offender. If the law will substitute for
its present theory of maximum criminal sentences the conception that
societies right to be protected from crime is paramount to any abnormal individual's right to release at some arbitrarily predetermined
date we will make it possible for court procedure to exercise recidivistic control over a high percentage of criminal offenders.
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Modem courts must adopt the conception that both mitigation
and continuing jurisdiction play a part in dealing successfully with
crime by means of the criminal sentence. There must be no legal
barriers which prevent society from receiving the greatest possible
benefit from scientific advances which if properly used will augment
the social capacity to handle crime. Any advances which are predicated upon the intelligent application of known principles open the
door to a broader opportunity for the law to accomplish a higher
standard of social protection. The adaptation of the old order to the
performance of new duties is an expression of growth which cannot be long denied.

